I am generally not a huge fan of stories about night-time SEAL raids to ‘eliminate’ a terrorist leader, so it was with some reluctance that I picked up this book ‘Team of Teams’ by General Stanley McChrystal. I was intrigued though, as the title had cropped up a few times in the context of organisations turning to concepts of self-management in order to deal with complexity. How could that possible apply to the hierarchical command-and-control world of an army?
Luckily, this is much less a book for war geeks and much more for leaders who want to be challenged on how to get the best out of their organisations. Co-written with three experts in organisational change, the General reflects on why he had to totally reinvent how the US armed forces tackled the challenges of fighting an insurgent war in Iraq against the local Al Qaeda branch, and what to it took to achieve that. If you are convinced that the only way to get your organisation to perform is through command and control, be prepared to be challenged.
The book describes how McChrystal, in charge of the Joint Special Operations Task Force – the elite of the US armed forces - was outdone by a ragtag army of insurgents. On paper, this shouldn’t have been a contest. The Task Force had the best of everything: arms, training, troops, technology, experience, financial resources. Yet they were losing the war against a flexible, decentralised, shape-shifting opponent who always seemed two steps ahead. The General realised that what his force was built for was not what was needed. They were built for efficiency, he needed flexibility. They were the perfect solution for a twentieth century war, but unsuitable for a twenty-first century insurgency.
Like so many of our organisations, modern armies have been heavily influenced by Taylorian thinking (as well as earlier military history) on what makes an operation most efficient. McChrystal reminds us of Taylor’s organisation-as-a-machine paradigm, which led to refining every element to its most efficient form. This reductionist thinking assumes that there is one best way of doing things. Furthermore, it believes that there are some who are paid for decision-making and some for simply carrying out orders. As long as these components work together like a well-oiled machine, the best possible output will surely follow. Which – to be fair – was indeed the case in the days of industrialisation in the 19th and 20th centuries.
However, as time has gone on, the world has become increasingly complex, and the book takes some time to explore the difference between being able to address complicated (such as the combustion engine) versus complex issues (such as predicting the weather). A Taylorian organisation, which captures everything in rules, resources and decisions, may be able to tackle the former, it is wholly unsuitable for the latter. Once we have entered a ‘VUCA’ world (volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous) a different solution is needed. One where efficiency is not the focus, but effectivity: doing the right thing as opposed to doing things right.
In Part 2 the book delves into the world of teams. Why does SEAL training focus more on team building through trust and shared purpose than on physical and tactical skills? Why are airline crew members trained to speak up and take action when needed? Why does diversity improve decision-making and collective responsibility lead to better outcomes? There are clear examples and ample evidence why this is the case and for years the army had benefitted from creating great elite teams. But the author realised that his problems originated in the fault-lines BETWEEN teams. Silos, internal competition and distrust, conflicting objectives and a rigid command structure all contributed to the organisation at large not achieving its goals. The solution: the Task Force had to become a ‘team of teams’, where trust and purpose where the binding forces between teams just like they were between individual team members.
Easier said than done of course, and Part 3 takes us along on McChrystal’s journey. As we learn from NASA, the Krasnovian football team and other examples, he describes how he arrived at the conclusion that what was needed was ‘shared consciousness’, i.e. for all parts of the organisation to have a shared, holistic and adaptive understanding of the environment in which they were operating. This required unprecedent information-sharing and therefore trust.
To set the tone for this, practical and very visible changes were introduced. For starters, by setting up a Joint Operations Centre in which all parts of the organisation where located together in an open space to encourage information sharing. And through a monthly, worldwide Operations & Intelligence meeting, which brought together anyone who had a possible connection with intel, operations and expertise from around the world that could affect or support the effort to defeat the enemy.
By opening up and being generous with people and resources, steadily McChrystal secured the buy-in of all parts of the armed forces as well as the international intelligence and security network and slowly the results became visible on the ground too.
Part 4 describes how, now that the operations began to benefit from improved information sharing and greater levels of trust, the General became more aware of the implications for the leadership. No longer did it seem to make sense to segregate decision-making from operations. Up to that moment the chain of command played an essential role in many operational decisions. Paradoxically, the availability of more information and faster communication systems had led to central command taking more and more control. The General came to the realisation that the cost of the delays involved proved higher than that of possible errors. Instead they decided to move to a concept of ‘empowered execution’, allowing frontline operatives to make decisions themselves rather than pushing them up the chain: “eyes on, hands off”. As a result, decisions were not only made much faster, they also improved in quality, as the individual on the ground was much more aware of the local context than his superior ever could be and now more invested in the outcome.
McChrystal concludes that for a modern organisation to thrive, we need to abandon the idea that a leader provides all the answers. The temptation to lead as a chess master, controlling every move, must give way to an approach as a gardener, who nurtures, enables and supports.
I have worked with a good number of organisations who attempted to become more self-managing and introduce their equivalent of McChrystal’s team-of-teams. One of the most difficult hurdles to take was the hierarchy’s inability to let go and be comfortable with supporting rather than controlling the frontline. It is refreshing and encouraging to read about McChrystal’s challenges as well as his achievements. After all, if the US armed forces can become more nimble, why can’t you?
I also enjoyed the General’s reflections on his role as a leader in how to bring about the change. These involved physical elements (changing the space in which the central command operated), behavioural elements (sharing resources, being transparent) and the courage to actively let go. It underlined for me the necessity of leaders’ actions to be congruent with the kinds of characteristics they are hoping to establish in their organisations, especially when adopting aspects of self-management. And for it to start at the top if the whole of the organisation is to be involved. I don’t think General McChrystal would have succeeded if he had been Sergeant McChrystal instead.
A good read therefore, thoroughly recommended for those of you seeking inspiration and a sprinkling of confidence that similar outcomes are possible in your organisation.